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ALONG THE MIDWAY: SOME THOUGHTS ON 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION-AMENDING 
Clifton McCleskey* 
IN the American political circus there is apt to be going on at any given time a number of sideshows pretty much unrelated 
to the action under the Big Top. Essentially harmless and perhaps 
even functional for the system, they include the activities of the 
anti-vivisectionists, campaigns to impeach the Chief Justice, and the 
fratricidal spasms of various Marxist-oriented splinter movements. 
Among these sideshows, however, one has been distinguished by 
its perennial character and by the attention given to it by other-
wise sober and restrained persons. I refer to the attempt through 
state legislative petitions to get Congress to call a constitutional 
convention pursuant to article V. 
In the post-World War II period alone, we have seen the de-
velopment of three distinct movements directed toward that goal. 
The first of these (actually launched in 1941) was an assault on 
the federal income tax through a proposal to limit the maximum 
tax rate to twenty-five per cent. It scraped along for some years 
until its proponents abandoned it in the late 1950's, still claiming 
that they had enough petitions to demand the convention being 
sought.1 The second assault was officially mounted in 1962 when 
the Sixteenth General Assembly of the States (a creature of the 
state-supported Council of State Governments) resolved in favor 
of three proposed constitutional amendments. One contemplated 
a "Court of the Union" to displace the United States Supreme 
Court in certain of its functions; a second was designed to reverse 
the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr2 by limiting its jurisdiction; 
the third sought a revision in article V itself to allow a constitu-
tional amendment to be initiated on the basis of identically-worded 
state petitions without the necessity of congressional or even con-
vention action.3 That campaign was interrupted by the third move-
• Associate Professor of Government, University of Texas, B.A. 1955, University of 
Texas; Ph.D. 1960, Harvard University. 
1. See Fensterwald, Constitutional Law: The States and the Amending Process-A 
Reply, 46 A.B.A.J. 717 (1960); Packard, Constitutional Law: The States and the Amend-
ing Process, 45 A.B.A.J. 161 (1959); Note, Proposing Amendments to the United States 
Constitution by Convention, 70 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1067 (1957). 
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
3. See Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 
YALE L.J. 957 (1963); Bonfield, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: 
Some Problems, 39 NoTRE DAME LAw. 659 (1964); Graham, The Role of the States in 
Proposing Constitutional Amendments, 49 A.B.A.J. 1175 (1963). 
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ment set in motion in 1964, again by the Assembly of the States. 
The goal in this most recent effort was a constitutional convention 
to frame an amendment designed to forestall implementation or 
continuation of the judiciary's policies regarding the apportionment 
of legislative bodies.4 
In all three cases the sideshow has had a degree of success, as 
such things are measured. It is true that no convention has yet 
been called, and that substantive policy has seemingly been un-
affected. But lawyers, political scientists, members of Congress, and 
other wise men have been drawn to the scene in seemingly dispro-
portionate numbers, and a sizable body of them has been moved 
to make speeches, write law review articles, and otherwise expati-
ate on the subject of constitution-amending in general and the 
merits or demerits of particular proposals. This very symposium 
is further proof of our enduring fascination with this show. 
The truth of the matter is that I find it hard to take these peti-
tions seriously. Most state legislators appear to have the same dif-
ficulty, judging from the casualness and lack of careful scrutiny 
that have characterized their actions in voting up or down the peti-
tions to Congress for a constitutional convention. And while the 
mood of Congress is always a many-splendored mystery to laymen, 
my guess is that a Congress engrossed with difficult problems of 
war and peace, taxation, social disorder, and voyages to outer space 
is not likely to get involved with the issue of a convention to con-
sider the apportionment of legislative bodies. 
This should not be taken as critical of the scholarly effort over 
the past twenty years or so to arrive at a better understanding of 
the constitutional provisions being invoked. Even though the dis-
putants can hardly be said to have determined the outcome-it 
was never very likely that Congress would either order a conven-
tion or initiate the proposed amendments on its mvn-we are bet-
ter off for their involvement. Indeed, much of the knowledge I 
have on the subject is derived from the dialogue prompted by the 
three movements just reviewed. However, it does seem that some 
broader perspective is needed if we are to benefit from further 
debate on article V. It is with this objective in mind that I propose 
to do some prospecting around the general topic of constitutional 
change, although it can be predicted that more questions will be 
raised than answered. 
4. See the review of congressional opm1on, newspaper commentary, and legal 
analysis prepared by the AMERICA!II ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, A CONVENTION To AMEND 
THE CONSTITUTION, SPECIAL ANALYSIS No. 5 (1967) 
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I. THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE V 
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The logical starting point in this endeavor is the text of arti-
cle V, for its deceptively plain language conceals an array of am-
biguities: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem 
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on 
the Applications of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several 
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, 
in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of 
this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths 
of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, 
as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by 
the Congress . . . . 
In the course of almost two centuries of use of the congressional-
initiation, state-ratification amending procedure, we have been 
forced to grapple with a great many detailed questions of concern 
to the interested parties. May a governor exercise his veto power 
to block legislative ratification?5 Who decides how a ratifying con-
vention is to be created and organized?6 May a popular vote be sub-
stituted for ratification by legislative or convention action?7 How 
many years may an unratified proposal be kept pending?8 May a 
state withdraw ratification, or reverse previous unfavorable action?9 
Does "two thirds of both Houses" of Congress mean a two-thirds 
vote of all elected members, or of those present and voting (assum-
ing a quorum)?10 Are there limits on the subjects that may prop-
erly be dealt with by amendment?11 May Congress incorporate a 
time limit for consideration in a proposed amendment?12 Does the 
President have any formal role in the process of initiating pro-
posals?13 
5. On this question, see L. 0RFIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 66 n.89 
(1942). 
6. See Brown, The Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, 29 AM. PoL. Sex. 
REV. 1005 (1935). 
7. Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (answering the question in the 
negative). 
8. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (holding that it was up to Congress 
to decide whether a thirteen-year interval since initiation invalidated further ratifica-
tion proceedings); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (upholding congressional specifi-
cation of a seven-year limit on ratification). 
9. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (holding previous rejection to be re-
vocable, but upholding congressional precedents that ratification cannot be rescinded). 
10. See National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (upholding congressional de-
termination that two-thirds of those present and voting suffices). 
11. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (finding nothing unconstitutional in the 
substance of the nineteenth amendment). 
12. See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921). 
13. See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). 
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In view of these and a great many other perplexities connected 
with congressional initiation and with the ratifying process,14 it is 
hardly surprising that numerous problems are anticipated should 
Congress move under the alternative mode to convene a conven-
tion on the request of state legislatures. Nor is it surprising to find 
that such questions have been pressed most insistently by those 
who are opposed to the substantive goals being sought by amend-
ment-discouraging action by dwelling on real or exaggerated diffi-
culties is a time-honored tradition in American political discourse. 
But whatever their motives, these critics have raised quite impor-
tant points. What, for example, constitutes a valid petition which 
Congress must count in deciding whether it is obligated to call a 
convention under article V? Professor Black argues that, when 
amending the fundamental law, it is especially important to adhere 
very closely to form, and hence those petitions which are not iden-
tically worded need not be counted.15 Those petitions requesting 
a convention to promulgate an already drafted proposal may also 
be disregarded, according to Black, because article V contemplates 
a convention to "propose" amendments rather than to approve 
those already proposed by the drafters of the petitions. Another 
writer, addressing himself to the time span covered by petitions, 
concludes that earlier petitions may be disregarded when too long 
a time has elapsed or when there have been intervening socio-eco-
nomic developments (war, depression, and so forth) which alter the 
situation.16 Others have argued that petitions may be disregarded 
when they come from malapportioned state legislatures.17 
Another question that has been frequently raised pertains to 
the scope of a convention if one should happen to be called. Would 
it be limited to the subject matter indicated in the state petitions, 
or could Congress define its authority, or would the convention be 
free to consider any and all subjects? Some critics of the conven-
tion movement have taken the position that no limits can be set 
on the convention's activities, while others have argued that Con-
gress could set limits.18 All seem to agree, however, that the con-
vention would not necessarily be limited to the subject(s) dealt with 
in the state petitions.19 
14. The single most comprehensive examination of the legal complexities is L. OR-
FIELD, supra note 5. 
15. Black, supra note 3, at 863-64. But cf. Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and 
the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 949, 970 (1968). 
16. Note, supra note 1, at 1072-73. 
17. See the compilation of senatorial comments to this effect reported in AMERICAN 
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 29-31. 
18. Id. at 33-39; Bonfield, supra note 3, at 677-78. 
19. See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 15, at 992. 
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A third example of the kind of question being raised will suf-
fice. What would be the nature of congressional power to specify 
the composition and organization of a convention, and what role 
would the President have? Black's view is that Congress has rather 
complete discretion in getting the convention ready for business, 
and that voting in it could be on an individual rather than a state 
basis.20 Traditionally, the President has been formally excluded 
from the constitution-amending process, but it is argued that this 
is of doubtful propriety, and in any case that the reasoning ad-
vanced would not support exclusion of the Chief Executive from 
the convention process. 
Although these and other such questions are troublesome, it 
seems to me that on the whole, rather too much has been made of 
the problems associated with any effort at implementation of the 
"convention by petition" provisions of article V. It is very doubt-
ful that they are any greater in number or magnitude than those 
associated with the other provisions of article V, to which some-
how we have always been able to provide viable solutions. And, 
with all due respect to the reasoning offered in support of the in-
terpretations just reviewed, diametrically opposed conclusions have 
their mm plausibility. For example, with respect to the validity of 
state petitions, it is equally possible to argue that it is only neces-
sary to have the requisite number of states make clear their desire 
for a convention-more is not indicated by the provisions of arti-
cle V. And if favorable action by malapportioned legislatures on 
the nventy-second through the nventy-fifth amendments sufficed to 
win their ratification, why should not convention petitions from 
them be valid? As to the scope of a convention's deliberations, 
would it not be illogical to allow the states to bring about a con-
vention while giving Congress power to thwart the whole under-
taking by assigning responsibilities other than those originally con-
templated by the states? 
II. THE TRADITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL EXEGESIS 
My purpose in touching on some of the specific problems that 
have been raised and the interpretations offered is not to try to 
dissect them nor to reach final conclusions about the merits of the 
competing viewpoints. It is rather to demonstrate the inconclusive 
nature of that debate-an inconclusiveness inherent in the tradi-
tion of constitutional exegesis that has long dominated the treat-
ment of issues of this sort. When policy issues having constitutional 
20. Black, supra note 3, at 964-65. 
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implications arise, one chooses one's ground on whatever basis, one 
consults the Founding Fathers, one cites appropriate precedent and 
authority, and one conjures up problems which must be solved or 
solutions to problems thought up by someone else. Having done all 
this, one has conformed to the tradition <?f discourse and has there-
by missed (or dodged?) a great many of the real issues and ques-
tions. 
Somehow a way must be found to escape entrapment in that 
tradition and to develop instead a basis for a modern reading of 
the Constitution, including article V. To do that we must first dis-
pose of "the intent of the Founding Fathers." Although the great 
gaps in what cah be known of their thinking should give anyone 
pause,21 my objection is not based primarily on the difficulty of 
knowing what they intended. Neither is it rooted in any desire to 
denigrate. That they were great men I freely admit, and that they 
sometimes had hold of enduring principles may be further acknowl-
edged. We should, therefore, consult their wisdom in the same way 
that we might turn to John Locke or to Thomas Jefferson. 
But the search for "the intent of the Founding Fathers," so 
familiar in American constitutional interpretation,22 goes well be-
yond that sort of undertaking. It assumes instead that we are some-
how obligated to conform in present-day usage to the thinking of 
the delegates at Philadelphia. There are two compelling objections 
that can be raised against this viewpoint. First, it may simply be 
denied that our subordination to the Constitution derives from the 
action of any assemblage of people in the late eighteenth century. 
I would be as hard-pressed as most to provide a rigorous explica-
tion of the source of political obligation, but that it is of a con-
temporary nature seems beyond question. What the leaders of 1787 
intended by a given provision is thus of no particular relevance to 
us in 1968. 
But even if this view is rejected, even if one is willing to be 
bound by eighteenth century viewpoints, there remains the crucial 
question: Whose viewpoint is relevant and binding? If the Con-
stitution derives its legitimacy from the Founding Fathers, then 
no doubt their views would be controlling. But when we confront 
the issue squarely, even the most dedicated worshipper of the 
Founding Fathers must admit that the ultimate legitimizing ac-
tion was that taken in the State ratifying conventions. Thus it is 
21. Anderson, The Intention of the Framers: A Note on Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 49 AM. PoL. Ser. R.Ev. 340 (1955). 
22. For examples of this approach to the analysis of article V, see L. ORFIELD, supra 
note 5, at 116-18; Black, supra note 3, at 963; Note, supra note I. 
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the "intent" there that must be heeded, not that of the Founding 
Fathers.23 So far no one has shown much stomach for taking up 
that investigation. 
This argument that we should dismiss the ruminations of the 
Founding Fathers, except as we can find in them some still-valid 
principles, can be extended to cover all that has taken place sub-
sequently. It is all very interesting but basically irrelevant that the 
Supreme Court in Hawke v. Smith, No. 124 in 1920 interpreted 
article V to be exclusive, thus barring the use of other methods 
of constitutional initiation and ratification, or that Congress has 
generally acted through the years to keep the President from play-
ing any role in the formal amending process. We need not feel 
bound by those precedents; what really matters is our views and 
our needs and our values. To argue so is not to deny the impor-
tance of the concept of constitutionalism and all that it entails, but 
it is to assert that this Constitution must be kept responsive to the 
needs and aspirations of the people who are being governed under 
it at any given time. 
We must, therefore, divorce ourselves from the traditional ap-
proach, with its extrapolation from the intent of the Founding 
Fathers and precedent, and seek instead the development of general 
principles which will allow us to deal with what appear to be some 
of the more fundamental issues and questions: What is the relation-
ship of the formal amending process to other methods of constitu-
tional change, and when is one preferable to the other? Which of 
the alternative methods for initiating and for ratifying formal 
amendments is superior, and why? What is the proper role of such 
governmental institutions as Congress, the President, state legisla-
tures, and the courts in the amending process? Above all, what can 
be done to make the provisions of article V more useful and more 
meaningful to us? When we can answer questions of this sort, we 
will be well on our way to disposing of article V as a constitutional 
issue. 
III. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION-AMENDING 
I suggest that we begin our approach to these questions with an 
examination of formal amending procedures employed in other 
nations. It seems reasonable to limit this review to those political 
systems that have some claim to classification as democracies, and to 
those that are more or less federal in nature as ·well. Even with these 
23. The point is Anderson's, although he does not press it. Anderson, supra note 
20, at !141. 
24. 253 U.S. 221 (1920). 
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limitations there are more cases than can be conveniently examined 
here, and so the discussion will center on seven nations with rela-
tively stable systems constituting a cross section of sorts of federal 
democracies: Australia, India, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Switzer-
land, and West Germany. 25 I shall also touch on the amending pro-
visions contained in the American state constitutions. 
The first three nations mentioned achieved their present status 
through the British Empire and Commonwealth, and may logically 
be considered together. In Australia, constitutional amendments are 
initiated by an absolute majority in each House of Parliament, 
typically as a government measure.26 If one house refuses to con-
cur in the proposal of the other, there are provisions for an 
alternative procedure to initiate the proposal of the one house. 
Ratification (by popular vote) requires a majority of those voting 
on the proposition and a majority of the states. The state legislatures 
may not initiate proposals or force conventions, nor are they in-
volved in the process of ratification. 
In India, the national legislature is normally both the initiator 
and the ratifier of constitutional amendments. 27 The process requires 
a two-thirds majority of those present and voting in each house, 
provided that the vote for the proposal is equal to or greater than an 
absolute majority of elected members in each chamber. Measures 
so passed are effective upon the assent of the President, with one 
notable exception: amendments which touch upon the division of 
authority between the states and the national government must also 
be ratified by the legislatures in at least half the states. 
In Canada, the process of formal constitutional change is clouded 
considerably by the lack of any provision in the fundamental law for 
future amendments, a situation made understandable by the fact 
that the fundamental law is itself statutory in form. 28 Amendments 
to those fundamental laws affecting the Dominion government 
25. Except as othenl'ise noted, I have relied here on the analysis and the constitu-
tional texts presented in w. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1956). 
However, I have not in all instances accepted the implications of that authoritative 
treatment. English language versions of the constitutions of the world are conveniently 
assembled in A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (1950) (3 volumes). 
Since amending procedures in Brazil and Argentina do not fit the pattern found 
for most of the other nations considered, the skeptical reader may wonder about their 
exclusion here. The decision not to include them, made before I had any knowledge of 
their provisions, was based on the political instability of those countries in recent 
years. Mexico and Venezuela seemed more deserving of the label "federal democracies." 
26. CONSTITUTION ch. VIII, § 128 (Aust!.). 
27. CONSTITUTION pt. xx, art. 368 (India). 
28. The Constitution of Canada consists, in the main, of the British North American 
Act of 1867 "and subsequent amendments" to that Act. Since no statute stands on a 
higher level than any other, "amendment" may be by implication from the subsequent 
enactment of an inconsistent statute. See W. LIVINGSTONE, supra note 24, at 22-23. 
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alone may be made by the Dominion Parliament acting in normal 
fashion. Those provisions touching the federal system may be 
amended only by the Imperial (British) Parliament, which in turn 
acts only upon the request of the Dominion Parliament. Whether 
the Dominion Parliament should consult the provinces and if so, 
who in the provinces, is still a disputed issue among Canadian con-
stitutional theorists, but there is not much doubt that the Dominion 
Parliament can as a matter of right request imperial legislation with-
out obtaining provincial approval. It is worth noting that the Do-
minion Parliament was eventually successful in establishing that it 
alone can petition the imperial body for legislation-the Dominion 
government no longer claims such a right. 
It might be instructive next to consider the amending process in 
two federal systems whose origins reflect some influence from the 
United States. In Mexico, amendments are initiated by a vote of 
two-thirds of the members present in Congress, with ratification 
requiring favorable action in a majority of the state legislatures.29 
In Venezuela the initiation of amendments requires approval by a 
simple majority in each house of Congress of proposals submitted 
by one-fourth of the members of one house or by the legislatures in 
one-fourth of the states.30 Two-thirds of the state legislatures must 
then ratify the proposed amendment. More stringent procedures are 
required where general constitutional reform is proposed: one-third 
of the members of the entire Congress or a majority of state legis-
latures must submit the proposal; admittance of such proposals by 
the Congress (in joint session) requires a two-thirds vote. Once ad-
mitted, the proposals may be initiated by Congress by a simple ma-
jority vote. Ratification of a general constitutional reform requires 
a referendum in which approval is expressed by "a majority of the 
voters of the entire Republic." The constitution explicitly bars the 
President from the vetoing of amendments or general reforms, and 
gives him only a ministerial role in the promulgation of changes. 
Finally, we might note the pattern in two other federal systems: 
Switzerland and West Germany. The Swiss constitution contemplates 
both total revision and partial or specific change.31 Total revision 
may be initiated by the two houses of the Federal Assembly in the 
same fashion as ordinary law, with introduction by any member of 
either chamber or by executive message. If the advisability of total 
revision or the form of a new constitution cannot be agreed upon by 
29. CONSTITUTION tit. VIII, art. 135 (Mex.). 
30. This summary is drawn from the text presented in PAN AMERICAN UNION, 
CONSTITUTION OF THE Rfil>UBUC OF VENEZUELA, 1961 (1963). 
31. CONSTITUTION ch. III, arts. 118-23 (Switz.). 
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both houses, then a preliminary referendum is held to decide 
whether there should be such a revision. Total revision also may be 
initiated through a petition signed by 50,000 voters and, again, ap-
proved by a popular referendum. Under either mode, actual re-
vision is then undertaken by a newly elected Federal Assembly. 
Regardless of the method of initiation, ratification requires a popular 
referendum in which there is approval by a double majority: a 
majority of those voting on the proposal, and a majority of the 
voters in a majority of the cantons. 
Partial revision in Switzerland may be accomplished through 
amendments initiated by the Federal Assembly and ratified by 
referendum, with again the necessity of a double majority. Amend-
ments may also be initiated by the petition method, either as a state-
ment of principle which must be drafted into formal constitutional 
terms by the assembly, or as a formally stated amendment. If the 
former, the assembly may require a favorable referendum before 
proceeding with the drafting. If the latter, the assembly may offer 
an alternative to be voted on at the same time or may recommend 
disapproval of the original proposal. In either case, the voters even-
tually are assured of an opportunity to pass judgment on the pro-
posed amendment, a double majority being needed. 
The 1949 Bonn constitution for West Germany provides for 
constitutional amendments to be initiated and adopted by a two-
thirds vote of the membership of the Bundestag and by two-thirds 
of those voting in the Bundesrat.32 Neither popular ratification nor 
Lander (states) approval is necessary, although it must be noted that 
the Lander are represented as such in the Bundesrat by members of 
each Land government who must vote by states. The amending 
process may not be used to change certain provisions regarding the 
federal system. 
Also relevant to an examination of democratic processes in con-
stitution-amending are the procedures found in the fifty American 
states.3 :3 All of the states now allow the legislative branch to initiate 
constitutional amendments. In nineteen states a two-thirds vote is 
necessary to initiate proposals, and in another eight states a three-
fifths majority is required. Of the seventeen states which permit only 
a simple majority vote to initiate amendments, about half require 
such vote in two successive legislative sessions before deeming the 
32. CONSTITUTION art. 79 (Fed. Rep. of Ger.). 
33. The following account draws on W. GRAVES, MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CON• 
STITUTIONAL REvisION (1960); Shull, Legislature and the Process of Constitutional 
Amendment, 53 KY. L.J. 531 (1965); COUNCIL OF STATE GoVERNMENTS, BOOK OF nm 
STATES, 1966-67 (1966). 
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proposal initiated. The remaining six states have a miscellany of 
initiation provisions that cannot be conveniently categorized. It 
should be stressed that in most states the required vote-two-thirds, 
three-fifths, or simple majority-is a vote of all elected members, 
not just those present and voting. 
The overwhelming majority of state legislatures have as well the 
authority to call constitutional conventions, either as a matter of 
explicit grant or by construction and settled practice; in only four 
states is this still an unsettled matter.34 In a little over half of the 
states, the call for a convention requires a two-thirds vote; in most 
of the remaining states a simple majority suffices. 
A third method of proposing amendments is available in the 
fourteen states allowing the popular initiative. When supported by 
petitions signed by a specified number of voters (usually a figure 
equal to eight to ten per cent of the voters in a recent general elec-
tion), proposed amendments are presented to the electorate for ap-
proval or disapproval. 
In the vast majority of states the process of popular ratification 
requires only a majority of those voting on the amendment but a 
few states require a majority of those voting in the election. Others 
have various provisions, such as New Hampshire's requirement of 
a two-thirds vote or Nebraska's that the majority in favor must equal 
thirty-five per cent of the election vote. Delaware is distinguished 
by the fact that the voters never have the opportunity to pass on 
proposed amendments; legislative action in two consecutive sessions 
is final. Only a very few states provide for ratification on some sub-
state level, such as counties or municipal corporations. In New 
Mexico, certain constitutional provisions relating to suffrage and 
education can be amended only if the proposal is approved by a 
three-fourths vote in the legislature and by a three-fourths majority 
of the voters representing a two-thirds vote in each county. In 
Georgia amendments of a local nature need only to be approved in 
the subdivision affected by the proposal. r 
In concluding this review of state practices, it should also be 
noted that the states have followed the example of the national con-
stitution in denying a formal role for the chief executive in the 
amendment process. They have also neglected to make any provision 
for the resolution of conflict or deadlock between the two legislative 
chambers when considering proposals for amendments. 
Comparative data on constitution-amending drawn from other 
nations and from the fifty states are helpful in evaluating the role of 
ll4. Indiana, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Vermont. 
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article V, but for our purposes they must be tempered with reasoning 
based generally on democratic political theory. I do not think it 
necessary to embark here on an extended discussion of that most 
slippery concept. Suffice it to say that my thinking is in line with 
such contemporary ·writers on the subject as Henry Mayo, Austin 
Ranney, and the late Wilmoore Kendall.35 Their basic emphasis is 
procedural, and hence "democracy" is defined in terms of political 
equality, popular sovereignty, majority rule, and representative in-
stitutions. In any event, it is doubtful that my comments below 
would be much affected by the use of some alternative formulation, 
so long as the concept of democracy is used with enough precision to 
distinguish it from such related concepts as "liberalism" or "con-
stitutionalism." 
IV. TOWARD THE MODERNIZATION OF .ARTICLE V 
It might be wise to begin with a reminder that the formal amend-
ing process does not, and should not be expected to, carry the major 
burden of constitutional change. Every schoolboy knows that our 
Constitution is subject to change through informal processes as well 
as through formal amendment. The Supreme Court and lesser 
courts, Congress, the President, the bureaucracy, political parties, 
interest groups, and in an ultimate sense even individual citizens are 
all involved in a ceaseless effort to reshape the American Constitu-
tion. Some of this effort is wasted, and a part of the tugging and 
hauling cancels out, but some of it eventually succeeds in giving 
birth to new constitutional principles without benefit of baptismal 
rites, so to speak. This sort of process is not peculiar to the United 
States, although it is doubtless the subject of somewhat greater notice 
here and in other countries where there is a written constitution 
and a specified amending process. 
The relative importance of these agencies of informal change is 
as unsettled in theory as it is varied in practice. After an historical 
review of American political thinking on the broad question of the 
responsibility for constitutional interpretation, Donald Morgan was 
able to identify three principal theories.36 One, which he calls the 
Jeffersonian or "political" solution, intends for each of the three 
branches of government to share in the resolution of constitutional 
issues, with that branch entitled to prevail which has the ultimate 
responsibility for action. The Marshallian or "juristic" position 
concedes some responsibility for constitutional decision to the other 
35. H. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1960); A. RANNEY&: W. 
KENDALL, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM (1956). 
36. D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF REsPONSIBILITY 71-98, 
331-62 (1966). 
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branches, but, by emphasizing the rule of law and the paramount 
position of the national government vis-a-vis the states, manages to 
give a degree of primacy to the judiciary. The third viewpoint, 
which Morgan refers to as that of "judicial monopoly," postulates a 
sharp division between policy and constitutional issues. Policy ques-
tions are properly the province of the political agencies of govern-
ment; constitutional issues arising in connection with policy should 
be deferred to the courts as possessors of the necessary independence, 
specialized skills, and acuteness of judgment. There is no need to 
repeat Morgan's arguments here, but I agree with his conclusion 
that the Jeffersonian system is most satisfactory as a model for de-
scribing the relative responsibilities which "ought" to prevail. 
Our reliance on the informal method is apparent in the record: 
only twenty-five formal changes in almost 180 years. The difficulty 
of the initiating process has contributed significantly to this; the 
congressional screen has been so fine that only five proposed amend-
ments have failed of ratification by the states.37 There are, of course, 
good reasons why informal change is often preferred: it can be in-
troduced tentatively and shaped gradually; it requires less mobiliza-
tion and less political effort; it helps to diffuse responsibility; and 
it provides alternative channels for action to bring about change. 
The proper mix of formal and informal change is necessarily 
difficult to ascertain. Some constitutional provisions are so specific 
that only formal amendment will suffice as, for example, the selec-
tion of Senators or the schedule for congressional sessions. In other 
cases, the formal amending process is a kind of ultimate weapon to 
be drmvn only when the agents of informal change are too hostile or 
too divided, exemplified by the hostility of the courts in delaying 
the income tax for two decades. And too, because formal changes are 
paramount over informal ones, they are often desired as a means of 
fixing some policy or principle more securely. When the leading 
agents of informal change are not politically responsible it would 
seem particularly important to provide a relatively liberal amending 
process. On the other hand, when those agents are popularly chosen 
one can safely tolerate a much more rigid procedure for formal 
amendments. 
Turning now to the method of initiating formal amendments, 
what general principles can we draw from the previous examination 
of national and state procedures? It should be abundantly clear that 
the legislative assembly constitutes the principal avenue of initia-
tion-every federal system reviewed and all of the American states 
37. By comparison, in a large number of American states from two-fifths to one-half 
of all proposed amendments fail to be ratified; in a few cases the rate of failure is 
even higher. CoUNcn. OF STATE GoVERNMENTS, supra note 32, at IO. 
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so empower their legislatures. Equally striking is the frequent ap-
parent exclusion of the executive from the initiating process. In 
parliamentary systems, the justification behind this is doubtless the 
integral relationship between legislative and executive branches-
indeed, ultimate control may be legislative in theory but executive 
in fact, but in either event the two are closely intertwined. No such 
explanation justifies the exclusion of the chief executive in presi-
dential systems. The problem appears to be in part one of cultural 
lag. The early stages of the development of self-government were 
dominated by representative assemblies, and we have not yet ad-
justed our thinking about constitutional amendments to take into 
account the fact that in a modern presidential system the chief exec-
utive is equally apt to be representative of the popular will and 
hence entitled to share in the process of initiation. 
As to the provision of alternative modes of initiation which by-
pass legislative bodies, the comparative evidence is mixed-some 
nations and some states provide alternatives, others do not. The prin-
cipal justification for such an alternative is presumably that advanced 
long ago by George Mason, who was worried that the representative 
assembly might become oppressive and refuse to initiate needed 
reforms.118 I am not much persuaded by this argument, since an 
oppressive legislative body that will not conform to existing constitu-
tional limitations is unlikely to heed new ones no matter how 
initiated and ratified. However, if an alternative mode of initiation 
is to be provided; almost certainly it should not take the form of 
allowing state legislatures to force the calling of a convention or to 
initiate specific proposals. We found no case for subnational assem-
blies being so empowered in any of the seven federal democracies 
examined, nor on a substate level in the American states. If the 
theory is to reserve to the people a means of forcing changes in the 
fundamental law when their representatives are unresponsive, why 
should initiation be left to intermediate representatives? State legis-
latures, traditionally and inherently, are agents of parochialism 
and cannot be expected to maintain the national perspective needed 
in proposing amendments to the federal constitution. Thus, if an 
alternative mode of initiation seems necessary, it should be based 
upon popular action in the fashion of the initiative provided in 
Switzerland and in a number of American states. 
The same reasoning applies equally to the ratification process. Of 
the seven nations examined, only Mexico and Venezuela provide for 
ratification of amendments by state legislatures; the remainder 
either specify popular vote or national legislative action. All but one 
38. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONsrlTUTION 629 (M. Farrand ed. 1966). 
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of the American states require a referendum on state constitutional 
amendments. Thus it is more than a little incongruous that article 
V has been construed to prohibit direct popular control of ratifica-
tion. My forte is not ·writing legal briefs, but surely a bench and bar 
that can find a constitutional right to a fairly apportioned Congress 
in article !39 or to the franchise without payment of a poll tax in the 
fourteenth amendment40 should have no trouble demonstrating a 
right of state voters to instruct their legislatures to approve or dis-
approve proposed amendments to the national constitution. 
To sum up the discussion to this point, the initiation of proposed 
amendments should be in the hands of those who are most directly 
responsible to the nation as a whole. This means, in particular, rep-
resentative assemblies, but includes as well the chief executive in 
presidential systems. If an alternative mode is thought desirable, the 
popular initiative should be chosen rather than allowing initiation 
by state legislative or convention action. A ratification process which 
is not based on direct popular approval or disapproval cannot be 
justified in our democracy. Those who insist on building federalism 
into the amending process should recognize that this goal may be 
achieved in a variety of ways.41 For example, representation by states 
in the national legislature, as in the United States Senate or German 
Bundesrat, structures a federal element into the initiation process, 
and the use of double majorities for ratification, as in Switzerland 
and Australia, does likewise for ratification. 
The shortcomings of article V have been detailed at earlier 
stages in our history, most notably in the period around the turn 
of the century when those in the Progressive movement, doubtful as 
to the possibility of getting certain policies adopted, engaged in a 
serious critique of the amending process.42 Senator La Follette's 
proposal for initiation by a simple majority in both houses of Con-
gress and for ratification by either a majority of voters in the nation 
or a majority of the voters in a majority of states appears to have 
been the most forthright assault on the problem. These changes, 
however, were themselves proposed as a constitutional amendment, 
and therein lay their fatal deficiency. 
But, though formal revision of article V seems unlikely, some 
possibilities exist as to informal modification. As Fred Graham has 
called to our attention, article V has already been so modified in 
practice that the states have been stripped of any meaningful role in 
39. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
40. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
41. See W. LIVINGSTON, supra note 25, at 303-10. 
42. These and other reform proposals are summarized in Martig, Amending the 
Constitution-Article Five: The Keystone of the Arch, 35 MICH. L. REv. 1253, 1277 
(1937). 
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proposing constitutional amendments.43 Congress has been the chief 
agent of this development by its refusal to call a convention in 
response to the various petitions from the states. Were article V to 
be reinterpreted to abandon the notion that its provisions are 
exclusive, several possible developments are apparent. For example, 
such an interpretation would allow Congress to call a convention 
on its own volition (conceivably by a simple majority vote).44 It 
would also permit state laws which would bind legislatures or ratify-
ing conventions to the results of referenda on proposed amendments. 
Provision could likewise be made for the entry of the President into 
the initiating process on a formal as well as an informal basis. While 
I would not wish to be accused of incitement to barratry, it is my 
considered judgment that we would be further along with the ra-
tionalization of article V if more legal talent were devoted to pro-
moting such revisionism.45 
In conclusion, Congress has over the years been most wise in its 
refusal to traffic with state calls for a constitutional convention. As it 
happens, my sympathies lie with the decisions since 1962 designed 
to ensure the principle of "one man-one vote" in the apportionment 
of legislative bodies, and hence I have no enthusiasm for the attempt 
to obtain a constitutional convention to undo that principle. More 
important than my feelings about that substantive issue, however, are 
the larger questions of sound and proper amending procedure. If 
new ground is to be broken in connection with article V, it should 
be in the democratizing directions indicated above. To allow the 
initiation of proposed amendments by state legislative petitions 
would be a step backward toward acceptance of a principle carried to 
its logical conclusion by the Confederate States of America, for in 
that system the only mode of initiating constitutional amendments 
was by state action. 
43. Graham, supra note 3, at 1176. Graham's treatment of the subject is distinguished 
from most others by his calm assessment of the realities, as opposed to the legalities, 
of the matter. 
44. For a way of viewing congressional powers that would support such an inter-
pretation, see Corwin &: Ramsey, The Constitutional Law of Constitutional Amend-
ments, 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 185, 196 (1951). 
45. A good place to start might be with persuading Congress that it can indeed 
reinterpret article V to bring about a more democratic process of amendment. In this 
effort one might have recourse to the words of Justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and 
Douglas, concurring in the result of Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1939): 
Congress, possessing exclusive power over the amending process, cannot be bound 
by and is under no duty to accept the pronouncements upon that exclusive power 
by this Court or by the Kansas Courts. Neither state nor Federal courts can review 
that power. Therefore any judicial expression amounting to more than mere 
acknowledgement of exclusive Congressional power over the political process of 
amendment is a mere admonition to the Congress in the nature of an advisory 
opinion, given wholly without constitutional authority. 
One of the more fascinating aspects of the current debate over article V is the extent 
to which this viewpoint has been ignored by both sides. 
